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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Audrey Marie Byrum appeals from

the district court’s intermediate appellate order

afﬁrming the magistrate court’s denial of her motion

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

In June 2017, an

an

erratic driver.

was unable
SUV), and

(Tr.

1,

t0 suppress.

anonymous

p.8, L.7

to maintain its lane,

tipster driving

— p.9, L.10;

0n 1-84 near Meridian called police

p.22, Ls.14-17.)

The

to report

tipster reported that the vehicle

and provided police with a description of the vehicle

(a

Toyota

license plate information. (10/16/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-10.)

Idaho State Police Trooper Eric Pesina was patrolling in the area, heard the dispatch
report,

and began looking for the vehicle described by the

p.9, L.5

—

p.10, L.1.)

One

tipster.

(10/16/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-16;

or two minutes after hearing the dispatch

vehicle that matched the description provided

provided the information. (10/16/17

Tr., p.10,

by
L.4

call,

the tipster, in the area

— p.1 1,

Trooper Pesina saw a

from Which the

tipster

L.6.)

Trooper Pesina followed the vehicle for approximately two miles t0 a gas station off 0f
the highway. (10/16/17 Tr., p.1

1,

L.17 — p.13, L.9; p.17, Ls.15-19.) In

this time,

Trooper Pesina

observed that the vehicle “was having a hard time maintaining their lane” and twice saw the
vehicle weaving and “making sharp turns t0 stay within

1

lane.” (10/16/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-20;

on the motion to suppress are from the
was lodged 0n April 28, 2019, Which has different pagination than
version lodged 0n June 6, 2018 for the intermediate appeal.

Citations to the 10/16/17 transcript of the hearing

version 0f the transcript that
the

its

p.23, L.13

—

p.24, L.2.)

Trooper Pesina did not remember seeing the vehicle cross any fog 0r

dotted street lines. (10/16/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.21-25.) Trooper Pesina effectuated a trafﬁc stop near
the gas station. (10/16/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-9.)

The

driver of the vehicle

was identiﬁed

Tr., p.13,

Ls.12-

Trooper Pesina smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and

16.)

observed that Byrum’s eyes were glassy.
tests

Audrey Byrum. (10/16/17

as

(R2, p.1

1.)

Byrum

failed the standard

and was arrested on suspicion of driving under the inﬂuence.

samples of .107 and .096.

(Id.)

The

state

charged

Byrum with

ﬁeld sobriety

She provided breath

(Id.)

second-offense driving under the

inﬂuence. (R., p.9.)

Byrum ﬁled

a motion to suppress, asserting that Trooper Pesina lacked reasonable

suspicion to effectuate the trafﬁc stop.

denied the motion t0 suppress. (10/16/17
substantial details 0f the

resulting in reasonable

anonymous

tip

(R., pp.16-18.)

Tr., p.35,

L.11

After a hearing, the magistrate court

—

p.38, L.9.)

The

court concluded that

were corroborated by Trooper Pesina’s observations,

suspicion t0 justify the trafﬁc stop.

(Id.)

The magistrate court

subsequently denied Byrum’s motion for reconsideration that was based upon Byrum’s

submission 0f an audio recording of the communications between dispatch and Trooper Pesina.
(R., pp.27-28, 30-32; 12/6/17 T123, p.5, Ls.2-13.)

2

Citations t0 the appellate record are t0 the

Amended

appellate record,

Which contains 139

pages.
3

of the 12/6/17 hearing 0n Byrum’s motion for reconsideration appears in the
lodged exhibits of this appeal.

The

transcript

Byrum

entered a conditional guilty plea to second-offense driving under the inﬂuence,

preserving her right t0 appeal the magistrate court’s denial 0f her motion t0 suppress. (R., pp.42-

47.)

The court imposed jail time and placed Byrum on supervised probation.

appealed t0 the
court afﬁrmed

district court.

0n

(R., pp.48-49.)

substantially the

In

same grounds

its

as set forth

Trooper Pesina possessed reasonable suspicion that

(R.,

pp.128-135.)

district court also

motion for reconsideration.
Court. (R., pp.139-141.)

(R.,

by

the magistrate court and agreed

Byrum was

afﬁrmed the magistrate

pp.135-136.)

Byrum

intermediate appellate capacity, the district

that

The

(R., p.42.)

Byrum

driving under the inﬂuence.
court’s denial of

Byrum’s

timely appealed t0 the Idaho Supreme

ISSUES

Byrum

states the issues

1.

Did the magistrate

2.

Did

0n appeal
err

as:

by denying Ms. Byrum’s motion

the magistrate abuse

its

discretion in denying

to suppress?

Ms. Byrum’s motion

to

reconsider the denial 0f her motion to suppress after reviewing the
dispatch audio recordings?

(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Byrum

failed to

show

that the district court erred

by afﬁrming

the magistrate court’s

by afﬁrming

the magistrate court’s

denial of her motion to suppress?

2.

Has Byrum

failed to

show

that the district court erred

denial of her motion for reconsideration?

ARGUMENT
I.

Bvrum Has

To Show That The

Failed

Denial

A.

District

Court Erred

Of Her Motion T0

BV Afﬁrming The Magistrate

Court’s

Suppress

Introduction

Byrum

contends that the magistrate court erred by denying her motion t0 suppress.4

A

(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-9.)

review of the record, however, reveals that the

district court

correctly recognized the applicable law, concluded that Trooper Pesina possessed reasonable

suspicion that

Byrum was

driving under the inﬂuence, and afﬁrmed the magistrate court’s denial

of Byrum’s motion to suppress.

B.

Standard

Of Review

On review

0f a decision rendered by a

district court in its intermediate appellate capacity,

the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.” State V. DeWitt, 145 Idaho

709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser V. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183

P.3d 758 (2008)).

4

If the district court properly applied the

Though a reviewing Idaho

appellate decision,
Instead, she

Bryum

law

t0 the facts the appellate court

appellate court directly reviews the district court’s intermediate

has not asserted any

makes no reference

district court error.

(m

Appellant’s brief.)

t0 the district court’s intermediate appellate decision

only that the magistrate court erred in denying her motion t0 suppress.
alleging error has the burden of showing

(E

id.)

and

asserts

The party

and the appellate court Will not search
the record for error. Akers V. D.L. White C0nst., Inc., 156 Idaho 37, 48, 320 P.3d 428, 439
(2013). Because Byrum has not attempted to meet her burden to show district court error, this
Court may afﬁrm the district court’s intermediate appellate order on that basis. Because the
arguments and issues presented t0 and decided by the magistrate and district courts in this case
were substantially similar, the state argues in this brief that the district court correctly afﬁrmed
the magistrate court’s denial orders, but does not speciﬁcally address the arguments made by

Bryum regarding the

it

in the record,

magistrate court’s decisions.

will

afﬁrm the

EQ

district court’s order.

145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758;

(citing Losser,

Nicholls V. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981)).

The standard 0f review 0f a suppression motion
motion

is

bifurcated.

When

to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s

are supported

a decision 0n a

ﬁndings of fact that

substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application 0f constitutional

by

principles to those facts. State V. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

C.

Court Correctly Afﬁrmed The Magistrate Court’s Denial Order

The

District

“A

trafﬁc stop

implicates the Fourth

State V.

m,

Amendment’s

constitutes

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

(Ct.

App. 2006)

(citing

Delaware

V.

440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable

Idaho 804, 81
less than

1,

Florida V. Roger, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State V. Bishop, 146

203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory detentions, based

probable cause, are permissible

suspicion that a person has committed, or

m,

a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and

Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785

cause to be reasonable.

0n

by an ofﬁcer

146 Idaho

at 81 1,

203 P.3d

at

is

when justiﬁed by an

ofﬁcer’s reasonable, articulable

about t0 commit, a crime.

m,

1210. Such a detention “is permissible if it

speciﬁc articulable facts which justify [reasonable] suspicion.” State

V.

449 U.s. 41

1,

417 (1981)).

is

at

498;

based upon

Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980,

983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Terry V. Ohio, 392 U.S.
States v. Cortez,

460 U.S.

1,

21 (1968);

m

The

relatively

low standard required

Rather, reasonable suspicion only requires a “showing of objective

t0 identify a speciﬁc crime.

and speciﬁc articulable

facts giving reason t0 believe that the individual has

be involved in some speciﬁc criminal
P.3d 391, 397

(Ct.

for reasonable suspicion does not require the police

activity.”

App. 2014) (emphasis

81

1,

203 P.3d

amounting

to

at

known

1210;

139 Idaho

a trafﬁc infraction

inﬂuence, the relevant test

is

may

at

V.

Therefore, “two instances of

reasonable suspicion 0f DUI.

of the

stop.

m,

V.

falls

I_d.

at

at

Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 443, 362 P.3d 514,

the fog line,” without more,

443-444, 262 P.3d

tip or a citizen’s report

146 Idaho

outside “the broad range of what

Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522, 525

The reasonable suspicion necessary

by an informant’s

evaluated based 0n the totality of

is

provide reasonable suspicion 0f driving under the

whether the driving pattern

moving on

329

983, 88 P.3d at 1223. While a driving pattern not

can be described as normal driving behavior.” State

518 (2015) (quoting State

about t0

in original).

to the ofﬁcer at or before the time

m,

is

State V. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 615,

Whether an ofﬁcer possessed reasonable suspicion
the circumstances

been 0r

to support

at

at

App. 1991)).

not sufﬁcient t0 arouse

518-519.

an investigative detention

of suspected criminal

U.S. 325, 329 (1990); Bishop, 146 Idaho

is

(Ct.

activity.

may be

Alabama

V.

supplied

White, 496

811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State V. Linenberger, 151

Idaho 680, 685, 263 P.3d 145, 150 (Ct. App. 2011); State

V.

Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d

334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000).

“Whether a

tip

amounts

t0

reasonable

suspicion depends

0n the

totality

of the

circumstances including the substance, source, and reliability 0f the information provided.”

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 81

1,

203 P.3d

the informant reveals the basis of

E

information.

United States

“An anonymous
anonymous

tip

V.

at

1210.

information’s tip

knowledge of the

tip

is

ﬂ alﬂ m,

that provides only description

146 Idaho

the informant

(9th Cir.

bears sufﬁcient indicia of reliability or

provide justiﬁcation for a stop.”

496 U.S.

at

m,

m,
at

t0

know

the

2006).

is

329; Florida V. J.L.,

When

the information

from an anonymous

tip

corroborated by independent police observations,

it

331-332).

and

that she

Ofﬁcers stopped the vehicle
Li.

at

Linenberger, 151 Idaho at 685, 263 P.3d at 150 (citing

an anonymous telephone

particular motel,

496 U.S.

812, 203 P.3d at 1211 (anonymous tip

tipster told authorities that

particular apartment building at a particular time, driving a

named motel.

came

0f subject and alleges commission 0f crime “generally Will not

give rise to reasonable suspicion”). “However,

In

considered more reliable if

alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis 0f knowledge 0r veracity.”

529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000));

m,

is

generally not enough to justify a stop because an

Linenberger, 151 Idaho at 685, 263 P.3d at 150 (citing

may

— how

Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 908

standing alone,

tip,

An

would be

after

observing

The Supreme Court

it

leave the

Plymouth

0f cocaine.

in possession

White would be leaving a
station

m,

named apartment and

wagon,

496 U.S.

at

t0 a

327.

drive towards the

ﬁrst recognized that because reasonable suspicion

is

a less

demanding standard than probable cause, not only can reasonable suspicion be established With
information that

is

different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause,

but reasonable suspicion can arise from information than

probable cause. Li.

at 330.

is less

reliable than is required to

show

The Court then held

that while “not every detail

mentioned by the

tipster

was

verified,”

(and Where the ofﬁcers did not themselves observe any criminal activity), the police were able t0
corroborate enough details from the tip so that there

was “reason

t0 believe that the caller

was

honest and well informed,” and thus the totality 0f circumstances could “impart some degree 0f
reliability t0 [the tipster’s] allegation that

White was engaged

in criminal activity.”

Li. at 326.

The Court explained:
The Court’s opinion
to the proposition that

he

things,

is

probably right about other facts

claim that the object of the

462 U.S. 213 (1983)] gave credit
shown t0 be right about some
that he has alleged, including the

in [Illinois V. Gates,

because an informant
tip is

engaged

is

in criminal activity.

Thus,

it is

not

unreasonable t0 conclude in this case that the independent corroboration by the
police of signiﬁcant aspects of the informer’s predictions imparted some degree

0f reliability t0 the other allegations made by the
Li. at

caller.

331-332.
In the present case, the district court recognized and applied the relevant law as set forth

above regarding reasonable suspicion and anonymous
the conclusions of the magistrate court.

totality

of the combined circumstances

vehicle

was “unable

described

by

(Id.)

of:

the tipster in a location

(R, pp.122-132.)

The court afﬁrmed

Speciﬁcally, the district court found that the

(1) the

t0 maintain his 1ane;” (2)

tips.

anonymous

tip that the driver

0f the suspect

Trooper Pesina’s soon-after locating of the vehicle

Which matched the

tip;

and

(3)

Trooper Pesina’s

own

observations that the driver of the suspect vehicle “was having a hard time maintaining their
lane” and

was “making sharp

turns to stay within

stop the vehicle. (Id.) This conclusion

is

its

1ane;” constituted reasonable suspicion t0

supported by the record.

Signiﬁcant details 0f the anonymous

tip

were corroborated by Trooper Pesina. Trooper

Pesina was able t0 locate the vehicle described by the

tip

Within minutes of receiving the

information from dispatch, in a geographic location Which was consistent With the
Tr., p.10,

L.2

—

p.1

1,

L.14.)

The

subject vehicle of the tip

vehicle make, type, and license plate information.

Alabama

White, Where there was n0

V.

reasonable suspicion

tipster

tip.

was 0n

E

the

Navarette

off the road

by

[anonymous]

was found

known

a speciﬁc vehicle

caller necessarily

basis for the tipster’s

vehicle.

—

least,

its

—

clear

that she

the

had been run

—

the

claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving.
tip’s reliability”)

was “unable

to maintain its

was not simply

drifting slightly

tipster speciﬁcally reported that the suspect vehicle

own

knowledge was

This enhances the credibility of the

lane.” (10/16/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-7.) This indicates that the vehicle

within

knowledge (but Where

a

That basis 0f knowledge lends signiﬁcant support to the

The

its

Further, unlike in cases such as

(Id.)

572 U.S. 393, 399 (2014) (“[b]y reporting

V. California,

(10/ 16/ 17

was deﬁnitively identiﬁed through

nonetheless), here, the basis of the

highway observing the suspect

tip.

lane, but actually failed to stay within its

contributed t0 a ﬁnding 0f reasonable suspicion.

own

E

lane.

This observation,

State V. Burns,

2015

at the

very

WL 5009867 at

*1-3 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2015) (unpublished) (afﬁrming denial of motion to suppress

Where ofﬁcer stopped vehicle based upon anonymous
his lane while driving”

and “was

speciﬁcity); State V. Ostrander,

(anonymous

tip that vehicle

all

tip that vehicle

was “unable

to maintain

over the road,” and where tipster described the vehicle with

2015

WL 4366693

was unable

at

*1-3 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished)

t0 maintain its lane

10

was sufﬁciently

reliable to constitute

reasonable suspicion for

DUI where

evidence indicated tipster personally observed the conduct,

even where the responding ofﬁcer did not observe such a driving pattern himself). The
the present case

driving

at

upon

was concerned enough

engage police about the vehicle While the

the highway. This also enhances the credibility of the

401 (recognizing that the credibility

light

t0

tips

made through

tip.

E

the 911 systems

tipster in

tipster

was

Navarette, 572 U.S.

may be

bolstered in

of “foregoing technological and regulatory developments” from Which a “reasonable ofﬁcer

could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system”)

Trooper Pesina’s
provided by the

tipster.

own

observations of the vehicle’s driving strengthened the suspicion

Trooper Pesina observed that the vehicle “was having a hard time

maintaining their lane” and twice saw the vehicle weaving and “making sharp turns to stay
Within

may

its

lane.” (10/16/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-20; p.23, L.13

— p.24,

L.2.)

not have themselves generated reasonable suspicion 0f driving under the inﬂuence,

Nial, 159 Idaho at 443-444, 362 P.3d at 518-519, they provided

observation in Niall.
not across, the fog

more than did

line.

Nial, 159 Idaho at 441, 362 P.3d at 516.

arouse reasonable suspicion of

However,

Though

DUI

under Idaho precedent.”

would have been a reasonable inference

for

him

t0

information, Trooper Pesina did not speciﬁcally testify that the

911 system. However, both 0f the parties described the
their

brieﬁng t0 the

the ofﬁcer’s

The Idaho Supreme Court

district court.

(R., pp.88, 102-104.)

11

tip as

line are not sufﬁcient t0

Li. at 443,

in the present case, the magistrate court described

it

ﬂ

In Niall, the ofﬁcer twice observed the suspect drive his vehicle onto, but

found that “[w]ithout more, the two instances 0f moving onto the fog

5

While these observations

362 P.3d

at 518.

Trooper Pesina’s testimony as

make at the time he received
anonymous tip came through

the
the

coming through the 911 system

in

relaying observations 0f “corrective measures” of “sharp turns to

(10/16/17 Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21.)

The

district court

lane.”

stay within the

adopted these ﬁndings

(R.,

pp.124-125), and

properly recognized that this driving pattern did not constitute “normal driving behavior.”

p.127 n.2 (citing State

V. Just,

(“Deputy Wright testiﬁed
the highway,

2006

WL

2616379

that, shortly after

weave within

his

own

V. Dalios,

own

m,

was lower than

activity, his observations

is

make

a jerkish sharp turn onto

trafﬁc lane several times, jerk the car back after

635 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn.

lane continuously

*5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished)

midnight, he saw Just

the fog line, and travel at a rate of speed that

Wright saw n0 criminal

at

enough, by

Ct.

it

the speed limit. .Although
.

touched

Deputy

provided a sufﬁcient basis for the stop”);

App. 2001) (Concluding

itself, to

(R.,

that

“weaving within one’s

provide a reasonable articulate suspicion”);

143 A.3d 712, 718 (Del. 2016) (“[W]hat happened here

is

m
m

much more

than weaving

Within the same lane. .the weaving, coupled With the sharp turn to avoid hitting a concrete island
.

is

easily recognized as driving behavior indicative of drunk driving”).

The

district court

found by the magistrate
decision to deny

recognized the applicable law, and correctly applied
court.

Byrum’s motion

The court

therefore properly

to suppress. This

it

t0 the facts

afﬁrmed the magistrate

court’s

Court should afﬁrm that determination.

II.

Bvrum Has

A.

Failed

Court’s

Introduction

Byrum
that

To Show That The District Court Erred BV Afﬁrming The Magistrate
Denial Of Her Motion For Reconsideration

contends that the magistrate court erred by denying her motion for reconsideration

was based upon an audio recording 0f

the communications between dispatch and Trooper

12

Pesina.

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

However, a review 0f the record reveals

that the district court

properly afﬁrmed the magistrate court’s use of discretion in denying the motion.

B.

Standard

The

Of Review

denial of a motion to reconsider

is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 320, 756 P.2d 1083, 1084
lower court abused

“Whether the

its

(Ct.

App. 1988). In evaluating whether a

discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry,

trial court: (1)

m

Which asks

correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted Within

the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable t0
the speciﬁc choices available t0

V. Herrera,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise of reason.”

164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg

V.

m

MV Fun Life,

163

Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

C.

The

District

Court Correctly Afﬁrmed The Magistrate Court’s Denial Order

While the Idaho Criminal Rules omit mention of motions or requests
trial

courts are free to entertain such motions

756 P.2d

When

for reconsideration,

they are made. Montague, 114 Idaho at 321,

at 1085.

In this case, after the magistrate court denied

Byrum’s motion

t0 suppress,

Byrum

obtained an audio recording 0f the communications between dispatch and Trooper Pesina.
pp.27-28, 30-32.) The district court would later transcript this audio recording as follows:
Dispatch: Units, westbound 1-84 at 44, trafﬁc complaint, possible DUI, standby.

13

(R.,

Dispatch:

Runner,

Units, control, continuing

home

westbound from 44, grey 2003 Toyota 4-

address in Meridian, reporting party

is still

behind.

Dispatch: 630 control, are you in a position for this call?

Ofﬁcer: Afﬁrm,
Dispatch:

I

am in position.

Cannot stay in

Vehicle

lane, Will continue t0 give milepost.

is

in far

left lane.

Ofﬁcer: Control 630, have they passed 44 yet?
Dispatch:

westbound

Afﬁrmative,

from

Approaching

44.

correction

44,

approaching 42, one mile.
Ofﬁcer: Control 630,

I

am behind the vehicle. What was

Dispatch: Unable t0 maintain lane, has been

all

the complaint?

over, reporting party will not give

a name.

Ofﬁcer: Copy, did they give a license plate?
Dispatch:
(R., pp.1 15-1

16 (footnote omitted).)

Byrum argued

that the magistrate court should

change

its

ruling

0n the motion

to

suppress because this audio recording indicated that Trooper Pesina did not receive speciﬁc

information about the nature 0f the anonymous

tip until

he was behind the suspect vehicle, and

even then, he was given only a “vague description of the driving pattern”
“unable t0 maintain lane” and “has been

all

over”).

(R., pp.30-32.)

The

(that the driver

state

argued that the

audio recording did not demonstrate that the magistrate court’s prior ruling was incorrect.
pp.34-38; 12/6/17 Tr., p.3, L.11

— p.4,

L.10.)

14

was

(R.,

(E

After a hearing, the magistrate court denied the motion for reconsideration.
generally, 12/6/17 Tr.)

The court noted

that

it

transcription of the dispatch recording, but that

suppress. (12/6/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-13.)

the magistrate court t0 consider

The

had reviewed the argument submitted and the

it

maintained

magistrate court’s decision t0 deny the motion.

original ruling

on the motion

t0

recognized the discretionary authority 0f

district court

Byrum’s motion

its

for reconsideration,

(R.,

pp.115-116.)

and then afﬁrmed the

A

review 0f the record

supports the district court’s conclusion.

The magistrate

combined circumstances

the totality 0f the

suspect vehicle

was “unable

vehicle described

own

court’s underlying decision t0

by

0f:

(1) the

to maintain his 1ane;” (2)

the tipster in a location

deny the motion

anonymous

t0 suppress

was based 0n

tip that the driver

0f the

Trooper Pesina’s soon—after locating 0f the

Which matched the

tip; (3)

and Trooper Pesina’s

observations that the driver 0f the suspect vehicle “was having a hard time maintaining their

lane” and

was “making sharp

turns to stay within

lane.”

its

L9.) The dispatch recording did not cast doubt on any of the
court in

making

its

determination, but rather

conﬁrmed

that

(10/16/17 Tr., p.35, L.11
facts relied

—

p.38,

upon by the magistrate

Trooper Pesina obtained the relevant

information prior t0 stopping Byrum.

The only apparent

difference

suppression hearing testimony that

between the audio recording and Trooper Pesina’s

may be

inferred

is

that

Trooper Pesina testiﬁed that dispatch
its

lane” prior to

(10/16/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-19.)

Whereas the

“br0adcast[ed] a trafﬁc complaint that evening of a vehicle unable to maintain

When Trooper

Pesina located the suspect vehicle.

dispatch audio indicates that dispatch ﬁrst broadcasted only that there

15

was a

trafﬁc complaint of

a “possible DUI,” and then provided speciﬁc information about the suspect vehicle’s driving
pattern only after Trooper Pesina

minor apparent discrepancy
dispatch before

Byrum

is

was behind

the vehicle

of no importance Where

effectuated a trafﬁc stop

any minor discrepancy impacted the

0n the

credibility

province of the magistrate court to determine.

0n the highway.
all

0f

this

vehicle. In

(R., pp.1 15-1 16.)

This

information was relayed by

any event, the extent

to

which

of Trooper Pesina’s testimony was within the

E

State V. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773,

229 P.3d

374, 378 (2010).
If anything, the audio recording

ﬁnding

that

added information supporting the magistrate court’s

Trooper Pesina possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. While Trooper

Pesina’s suppression hearing testimony indicated that he

tipster reported the suspect vehicle

p.17, L.23

—

p.

1

8, L.2),

was “unable

was informed

the audio recording additionally provided that dispatch informed Trooper

Additionally, the audio recording clariﬁed that the tipster

number of the suspect
The

was

all

over” (R., p.116).

able t0 relay the entire license

vehicle. (Id.)

district court correctly

Byrum’s motion

anonymous

t0 maintain lane” (10/16/17 T11, p.9, Ls.2-10;

Pesina that the tipster observed that the suspect vehicle “has been

plate

that the

afﬁrmed the magistrate

for reconsideration.

court’s discretionary decision t0

This Court should therefore afﬁrm the

intermediate appellate order.

16

deny

district court’s

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the

appellate order afﬁrming the magistrate court’s denials of

district court’s

Byrum’s motion

intermediate

to suppress

and

motion for reconsideration.
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